

been unreasonably restrained in its ability to compete, Comcast-NBCU should be compelled to pay damages to the independent network in the amount equal to the forgone licensing revenues since the discriminatory conduct began with interest. I understand that under the current regime, the independent network's right to recover forgone licensing revenues has not been affirmed.

236. Finally, as an alternative to the current program-carriage adjudication process, the Commission should consider employing a baseball-style arbitration process similar to the method used to adjudicate program-access complaints. Applied here, the independent network and Comcast-NBCU would proffer carriage proposals, including the tier and the price per subscriber, and an arbitrator would decide which of the two proposals was more appropriate. In addition to expediting the process, the baseball-style rules would likely induce Comcast-NBCU to make a more reasonable carriage offer from the onset of the dispute.

C. Remedies to Address Comcast's Tying of Affiliated Internet Content to the Purchase of Cable Television Service

237. The evidence presented above suggests that a primary motivation of the proposed transaction is to extend Comcast's market power into online content and to impair the ability of OTT providers to compete for Comcast's cable video subscribers. The Commission should consider the following remedies to address this potential abuse of market power:

238. *First*, Comcast-NBCU should be barred from tying access to online content on its Fancast portal (or to an NBC portal) to the purchase of a Comcast-NBCU cable video subscription or a Comcast-NBCU cable modem subscription. Online users who access the Internet via an alternative broadband access provider should be permitted to purchase access to Fancast Xfinity TV content on a standalone basis. Access to premium cable content (such as HBO) that is replicated on Fancast would require verification of the user's subscription to that content, presumably from a different MVPD. To steer online users to its bundle (Fancast, cable

television, and cable modem service), however, Comcast-NBCU could impose a “penalty price” for Fancast when purchased on a standalone basis by subscribers of rival broadband access providers. Similar to the a-la-carte restraint suggested above, the Commission could compel Comcast to offer its MVPD subscribers a rebate from their cable television-cable modem bundle equal to the retail price for standalone Fancast for those customers who opt out of Fancast.

239. *Second*, Comcast should be barred from conditioning carriage on an independent network’s agreement not to replicate video programming on the network’s online portal. Similarly, Comcast-NBCU should be barred from conditioning carriage on an independent network’s agreement not to license its programming to an OTT video provider.⁴⁵⁵ The ability of Comcast to do so shrinks the online portfolio of content, thereby reducing the private returns to investing in broadband access. Replication of a sports event by an independent sports network on its portal 24 hours after the event originally airs does not eviscerate the value of airing the event in real-time on Comcast’s cable system; it does create value, however, for the Internet ecosystem generally, which Comcast perceives to be a long-run threat to its cable television network.

240. *Third*, within one year of the acquisition, the combined company should be compelled to divest NBCU’s partial ownership in Hulu.com. Given the pivotal role that Hulu.com plays as an aggregator of network television programming on the Internet, and given the strong likelihood that Comcast would restrict access to Hulu.com, vertical integration here is simply unwise. Rather than placing (and then policing) access restrictions on Hulu.com for OTT providers, a better course is divestiture. Obvious candidates for acquiring NBCU’s shares in Hulu.com are the other owners of Hulu.com: Fox (News Corp) and ABC Networks (Disney). Free of any MVPD ownership, if Hulu.com decides to block access to OTT providers on a

455. Comcast should also be barred from offering a differential pricing scheme that induces an independent network not to (a) post its content online or (b) contract with an OTT video provider.

going-forward basis, then the reasons would be unrelated to impairing competition in the supply of MVPD services.

241. *Fourth*, the Commission should apply the program access protections to OTT video providers, and it should extend those protections in the event that Comcast-NBCU's affiliated programming is ported or replicated online. For example, the program access provisions currently prevent Comcast from denying its MVPD rivals access to Versus so long as Versus is delivered via satellite. (The weaknesses of the program access provisions and a potential cure are discussed above.) To evade those restrictions, the new entity could transfer certain must-have content from Versus to the Internet. To make matters concrete, if Comcast were to broadcast Sunday Night Football games (currently aired on NBC) on Versus, and if Comcast were to move those games to its Versus Website, then rival MVPDs would not have access to that must-have programming. Extension of the program access provisions to the Internet would ensure that rival MVPDs (and their customers) would have access to (transferred) online content so long as the rival MVPD had secured a license to the cable television feed of an affiliated network. As an alternative to extending the program access restrictions to the combined company's Internet properties, the Commission could simply prevent the new entity from transferring NBC's affiliated programming to either its affiliated cable networks or to its affiliated online portals.

242. *Fifth*, Comcast-NBCU should be barred from tying the purchase of the new entity's cable television service to its set-top box. Comcast currently allows its cable television customers to access Fancast online, but only from a computer. As described above, Comcast recognizes the threat that Internet access via the television poses to its cable television system. Because Comcast cannot be counted on to integrate features such as Wi-Fi access into its set-top


box,⁴⁵⁶ Comcast should be compelled to permit its cable television customers to purchase a set-top box from an independent provider.

CONCLUSION

243. For the foregoing reasons, the proposed transaction presents significant antitrust concerns. In the absence of any merger-specific conditions, the transaction would likely (a) impair competition in several MVPD markets, (b) weaken independent networks that compete with Comcast's or NBCU's affiliated networks, (c) retard the development of online video, and (d) undermine the incentive of rival broadband Internet access providers to invest in network infrastructure. Given its anticompetitive effects, the Commission should deny the proposed transaction. In the alternative, should the Commission approve the joint venture, it should condition its approval on the remedies advocated here.

* * *

I declare under penalty of perjury that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 21, 2010.


Hal J. Singer

456. In contrast, Verizon FiOS, an entrant in the MVPD industry, allows its television customers to access the Internet via their television by downloading "TV Widgets." See Download TV Widgets, *available at* <http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/aboutFiOS/Overview.htm#widgets>.

APPENDIX 1: CURRICULUM VITAE

HAL J. SINGER
NAVIGANT ECONOMICS
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EDUCATION

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Ph.D., 1999; M.A. (Economics), 1996.

TULANE UNIVERSITY, B.S. *magna cum laude* (Economics), 1994. Dean's Honor Scholar (full academic scholarship). Senior Scholar Prize in Economics, 1994.

CURRENT EMPLOYMENT

NAVIGANT ECONOMICS, Washington, D.C.: Managing Director, 2010-present.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, McDONOUGH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, Washington, D.C.: Adjunct Professor, 2010-present.

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

EMPIRIS, L.L.C., Washington, D.C.: Managing Partner and President, 2008-2010.

CRITERION ECONOMICS, L.L.C., Washington, D.C.: President, 2004-2008. Senior Vice President, 1999-2004.

LECG, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.: Senior Economist, 1998-99.

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, WASHINGTON, D.C.: Staff Economist, 1997-98.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, BALTIMORE: Teaching Assistant, 1996-98.

AUTHORED BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS

Valuing Life Settlements as a Real Option, co-authored with Joseph R. Mason, in *LONGEVITY TRADING AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS* (Vishaal Bhuyan ed., John Wiley & Sons 2009).

An Antitrust Analysis of the World Trade Organization's Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services, co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak, in *HANDBOOK OF TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST* (Philip Marsden, ed. Edward Elgar 2006).

BROADBAND IN EUROPE: HOW BRUSSELS CAN WIRE THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, co-authored with Dan Maldoom, Richard Marsden, and J. Gregory Sidak (Kluwer/Springer Press 2005).

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JOURNAL ARTICLES

1. *The Economic Impact of Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws*, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW (forthcoming 2010), co-authored with Joseph R. Mason and Robert B. Kulick.
2. *Why the iPhone Won't Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote its Successor*, 8 JOURNAL ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW (2010), co-authored with Robert W. Hahn.
3. *What Does an Economist Have to Say About the Calculation of Reasonable Royalties?*, 14 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW BULLETIN (2010), co-authored with Kyle Smith.
4. *Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division's Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger*, 4 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS (2008), co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak.
5. *Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission Decisions*, 21 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY (2008), co-authored with Robert W. Hahn.
6. *The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35*, 32 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY JOURNAL (2008), co-authored with Peter Cramton and Allan Ingraham.
7. *A Real-Option Approach to Valuing Life Settlement Transactions*, 23 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION (2008), co-authored with Joseph R. Mason.
8. *The Economics of Wireless Net Neutrality*, 3 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 399 (2007), co-authored with Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan.
9. *Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implication for Cable Operators*, 3 REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS 348 (2007), co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak.
10. *The Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality*, 5 JOURNAL ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND HIGH TECH LAW 533 (2007), co-authored with Robert E. Litan.
11. *Does Video Delivered Over a Telephone Network Require a Cable Franchise?*, 59 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL 251 (2007), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and J. Gregory Sidak.
12. *The Competitive Effects of a Cable Television Operator's Refusal to Carry DSL Advertising*, 2 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 301 (2006).
13. *Überregulation without Economics: The World Trade Organization's Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services*, 57 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL 1 (2004), co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak.
14. *The Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies: Uncovering Life Insurance's "Hidden" Value*, 6 MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR 95 (2004), co-authored with Neil A. Doherty and Brian A. O'Dea.
15. *Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment?*, 4 TOPICS IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY (2004), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and Allan T. Ingraham.
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19. *The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life Insurance*, 38 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 449 (2003), co-authored with Neil A. Doherty.
20. *The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet Access*, 17 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 954 (2002), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and J. Gregory Sidak.
21. *How Can Regulators Set Nonarbitrary Interim Rates? The Case of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland*, 3 JOURNAL OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 273 (2002), co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak.
22. *Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access*, 49 JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS (2001) 299, co-authored with Daniel L. Rubinfeld.
23. *Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger*, 16 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 640 (2001), co-authored with Daniel L. Rubinfeld.
24. *Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers*, 91 AMERICAN ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 302 (2001), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak.
25. *Residential Demand for Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers*, 18 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 1 (2001), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak.
26. *Determining the Source of Inter-License Synergies in Two-Way Paging Networks*, 18 JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS 59 (2000).
27. *A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in the Wireless Industry*, 50 HASTINGS LAW REVIEW 1639 (2000), co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak and David Teece.
28. *Capital Raising in Offshore Markets*, 23 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE 1181 (1999), co-authored with Ian Gray and Reena Aggarwal.

EXPERT TESTIMONY SINCE 2005

1. T-Mobile West Corporation v. Michael M. Crow, et al, Case No: 2:08-cv-1337 PHX-NVW (D. Az.).
2. Metlife Insurance Company of Connecticut and General American Life Insurance Company v. Thomas Petracek, Minnesota Estate Service, Inc., Michael J. Antonello, and Michael J. Antonenllo & Associates, Ltd., No. 08-CV-06095 DSD-FLN (D. Minn).
3. Tennis Channel, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, File No. CSR-8258 (Federal Communications Commission).
4. MEMdata, LLC, v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., and IHC Health Services, Inc., Civil No. 2:08-cv-190 (C.D. Utah).
5. Caroline Behrend, et al v. Comcast Corporation, Civil Action No. 03-6604 (E.D. Pa.).
6. In the Matter of Distribution of the 2000-03 Copyright Royalty Funds, Dkt. No. 2008-2 CRB CD 2000-03 (Copyright Royalty Judges).
7. Cindy Johnson et al v. Arizona Hospital and Health Care Association et al, Case No. 07-01292 (SRB) (D. Az.).
8. Southeast Missouri Hospital, et al v. C.R. Bard, Inc., Case No. 1:07CV0031 TCM (E.D. Mo.).
9. TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, L.L.P. v. Comcast Corporation, File No. CSR-8001-P (Federal Communications Commission).

10. Meijer, Inc. & Meijer Distribution, Inc., et al. v. Abbott Laboratories, Case No. C 07-5985 CW (N.D. Ca.).
11. NFL Enterprises LLC v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, File No. CSR-7876-P (Federal Communications Commission).
12. Medical Mutual of Ohio Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC and SmithKline Beecham Corporation, Civil Action No. 05-396 (E.D. Pa.).
13. TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, L.L.P., D/B/A Mid-Atlantic Sports Network v. Time Warner Cable Inc., American Arbitration Association, Case No. 12 494 E 000326 07 (Federal Communications Commission).
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16. Ralph O. Stalsberg, et al. v. New York Life Insurance Company, New York Life Insurance and Annuity Corporation, Case No. 2:07-Cv-29-Bj (D. Utah).
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1. The Economic Impact of Broadband Investment (prepared for Broadband for America), co-authored with Robert Crandall (Feb. 23, 2010).
2. Why the iPhone Won't Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote Its Successor (prepared for Mobile Future), co-authored with Robert Hahn (Sept. 21, 2009).
3. The Economic Impact of Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws (prepared for the American Bankers' Association), co-authored with Joseph R. Mason (Aug. 21, 2009).
4. Economic Effects of Tax Incentives for Broadband Infrastructure Deployment (prepared for the Fiber to the Home Council), co-authored with Jeffrey Eisenach and Jeffrey West (Dec. 23, 2008).
5. The Effect of Brokered Deposits and Asset Growth on the Likelihood of Failure (prepared for Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and UBS), co-authored with Joseph Mason and Jeffrey West (Dec. 17, 2008).
6. Estimating the Benefits and Costs of M2Z's Proposal: Reply to Wilkie's *Spectrum Auctions Are Not a Panacea* (prepared for CTIA), co-authored with Robert W. Hahn, Allan T. Ingraham and J. Gregory Sidak (July 23, 2008).
7. Is Greater Price Transparency Needed in The Medical Device Industry? (prepared for Advanced Medical Technology Association), co-authored with Robert W. Hahn (Nov. 30, 2007).
8. Should the FCC Depart from More than a Decade of Market-Oriented Spectrum Policy? Reply to Skrzypacz and Wilson (prepared for CTIA), co-authored with Gerald Faulhaber and Robert W. Hahn (Jun. 18, 2007).
9. Improving Public Safety Communications: An Analysis of Alternative Approaches (prepared for the Consumer Electronics Association and the High Tech DTV Coalition), co-authored with Peter Cramton, Thomas S. Dombrowsky, Jr., Jeffrey A. Eisenach, and Allan Ingraham (Feb. 6, 2007).
10. The Budgetary Impact of Eliminating the GPOs' Safe Harbor Exemption from the Anti-Kickback Statute of the Social Security Act (prepared for the Medical Device Manufacturers Association) (Dec. 20, 2005).

11. Reply to "The Life Settlements Market: An Actuarial Perspective on Consumer Economic Value" (prepared for Coventry First), co-authored with Eric Stallard (Nov. 15, 2005).
12. The Competitive Effects of Telephone Entry into Video Markets (prepared for the Internet Innovation Alliance), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and J. Gregory Sidak (Nov. 9, 2005).
13. How Do Consumers and the Auto Industry Respond to Changes in Exhaust Emission and Fuel Economy Standards? A Critique of Burke, Abeles, and Chen (prepared for General Motors Corp.), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and Allan T. Ingraham (Sept. 21, 2004).
14. Inter-City Competition for Retail Trade in North Texas: Can a TIF Generate Incremental Tax Receipts for the City of Dallas? (prepared for Harvest Partners), co-authored with Thomas G. Thibodeau and Allan T. Ingraham (July 16, 2004).
15. An Accurate Scorecard of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Rejoinder to the Phoenix Center Study No. 7 (prepared for BellSouth), co-authored with Robert Crandall (Jan. 6, 2004).
16. Competition in Broadband Provision and Implications for Regulatory Policy (prepared for the Alcatel, British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, France Telecom, Siemens, Telefónica de España, and Telecom Italia), co-authored with Dan Maldoom, Richard Marsden, and Gregory Sidak (Oct. 15, 2003).
17. The Effect of Ubiquitous Broadband Adoption on Investment, Jobs, and the U.S. Economy (prepared for Verizon), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall (Sept. 17, 2003).
18. The Deleterious Effect of Extending the Unbundling Regime on Telecommunications Investment (prepared for BellSouth), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall (July 10, 2003).
19. Letter Concerning Spectrum Auction 35 to the Honorable Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, from Peter C. Cramton, Robert W. Crandall, Robert W. Hahn, Robert G. Harris, Jerry A. Hausman, Thomas W. Hazlett, Douglas G. Lichtman, Paul W. MacAvoy, Paul R. Milgrom, Richard Schmalensee, J. Gregory Sidak, Hal J. Singer, Vernon L. Smith, William Taylor, and David J. Teece (Aug. 16, 2002).

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1. *Class Certification in Antitrust Cases: An Economic Framework*, George Mason Law Review Antitrust Symposium, co-authored with Robert Kulick (Feb. 2010).
2. *Addressing the Next Wave of Internet Regulation: The Case For Equal Opportunity*, Georgetown Center for Business and Policy, co authored with Robert Litan and Robert Hahn (Jan. 2010).
3. *Irrational Expectations: Can a Regulator Credibly Commit to Removing an Unbundling Obligation?*, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Related Publication No. 07-28, co-authored with Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Dec. 2007).
4. *An Antitrust Analysis of Google's Proposed Acquisition of DoubleClick*, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Related Publication No. 07-24, co-authored with Robert W. Hahn (Sept. 2007).
5. *Inter-City Competition for Retail Trade in North Texas: Can a TIF Generate Incremental Tax Receipts for the City of Dallas?*, co-authored with Thomas G. Thibodeau and Allan T. Ingraham (revise and resubmit to JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH) (July 16, 2004).
6. *An Economic Assessment of the Weight-Based CAFE Standard Proposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration*, co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and Allan T. Ingraham (Apr. 2004).

7. *How Common Are "Conflicts of Interests" in the Investment Banking Industry?*, co-authored with Charles W. Calomiris (Dec. 2003).
8. *Does Clustering by Incumbent MSOs Deter Entry by Overbuilders?* (July 2002).

SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS

1. *13th Annual Symposium on Antitrust*, GEORGE MASON LAW REVIEW, Washington, D.C., Feb. 4, 2010.
2. *Broadband Infrastructure and Net Neutrality*, ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CONGRESSIONAL INTERNET CAUCUS' STATE OF THE NET, Washington, D.C., Jan. 22, 2010.
3. *The Consequences of Net Neutrality Regulations*, AMERICAN CONSUMER INSTITUTE CENTER FOR CITIZEN RESEARCH, Washington, D.C., Nov. 19, 2009.
4. *Wireless Innovation Luncheon*, MOBILE FUTURE, Washington, D.C., Nov. 3, 2009.
5. *Second Life Settlements & Longevity Summit*, INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES & LIFE SETTLEMENTS, New York, N.Y., Sept. 30, 2009.
6. *Perspectives on Investment and a National Broadband Plan*, AMERICAN CONSUMER INSTITUTE, Washington, D.C., Sept. 4, 2009.
7. *Markets and Regulation: How Do We Best Serve Customers?*, Wireless U. Communications Policy Seminar, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PUBLIC UTILITY RESEARCH CENTER, Tampa, FL., Nov. 13, 2008.
8. *The Price Of Medical Technology: Are We Getting What We Pay For?* HEALTH AFFAIRS BRIEFING, Washington, D.C., Nov. 10, 2008.
9. *Standard Setting and Patent Pools*, LAW SEMINARS INTERNATIONAL, Arlington, VA., Oct. 3, 2008.
10. *The Changing Structure of the Telecommunications Industry and the New Role of Regulation*, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SOCIETY BIENNIAL CONFERENCE, Montreal, Canada, June 26, 2008.
11. *The Debate Over Network Management: An Economic Perspective*, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE CENTER FOR REGULATORY AND MARKET STUDIES, Washington, D.C., Apr. 2, 2008.
12. *Merger Policy in High-Tech Industries*, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1, 2008.
13. *Telecommunications Symposium*, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 2007.
14. *Wireless Practice Luncheon*, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS BAR ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 2007.
15. *Association for Computing Machinery's Net Neutrality Symposium*, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Washington, D.C., Nov. 12, 2007.
16. *Regulators' AdvanceComm Summit*, NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL, New York, N.Y., Oct. 14, 2007.
17. *Annual Conference*, CAPACITY USA 2007, New York, N.Y., Jun. 26, 2007.
18. *William Pitt Debating Union*, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, SCHOOL OF ARTS & SCIENCES, Pittsburgh, PA., Feb. 23, 2007.
19. *Annual Conference*, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, Washington, D.C., June 27, 2006.

20. *Annual Conference*, MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C., June 14, 2006.
21. *Annual Conference*, ASSOCIATION FOR ADVANCED LIFE UNDERWRITING, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2006.
22. *Entrepreneur Lecture Series*, LAFAYETTE COLLEGE, Easton, PA., Nov. 14, 2005.

EDITORIALS AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES

1. *Why the iPhone Won't Last Forever and What the Government Should (or Shouldn't) Do to Promote Its Successor*, MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW (2010), co-authored with Robert W. Hahn.
2. *Streamlining Consumer Financial Protection*, THE HILL, Oct. 13, 2009, co-authored with Joseph R. Mason.
3. *Is Greater Price Transparency Needed in the Medical Device Industry?*, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2008), co-authored with Robert W. Hahn and Keith Klovers.
4. *Foxes in the Henhouse: FCC Regulation through Merger Review*, MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW (First Quarter 2008), co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak.
5. *Don't Drink the CAFE Kool-Aid*, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 6, 2007, at A17, co-authored with Robert W. Crandall.
6. *The Knee-Jerk Reaction: Misunderstanding the XM/Sirius Merger*, WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 24, 2007, at A19, co-authored with J. Gregory Sidak.
7. *Net Neutrality: A Radical Form of Non-Discrimination*, REGULATION, Summer 2007.
8. *Telecom Time Warp*, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 11, 2007, at A15, co-authored with Robert W. Crandall.
9. *Earmarked Airwaves*, WASHINGTON POST, June 27, 2007, at A19, co-authored with Robert W. Hahn.
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MEMBERSHIPS

American Economics Association

American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law

REVIEWER

JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS

JOURNAL OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW

JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS

NAVIGANT ECONOMICS

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

June 21, 2010

ATTACHMENT C

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20554

In the Matter of)
)
Applications of Comcast Corporation,) MB Docket No. 10-56
General Electric Company and NBC)
Universal, Inc., for Consent to Assign)
Licenses or Transfer Control of Licenses)

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY OF DEBBIE GOLDMAN

I, Debbie Goldman, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.


1. I am Telecommunications Policy Director and Research Economist at CWA.
2. Communications Workers of America ("CWA") is a labor organization, representing approximately 700,000 workers in communications, media, airlines, manufacturing and public service. CWA advocates on its members' behalf through collective bargaining agreements and other means.
3. Members of CWA reside in communities presently served by NBC Universal owned-and-operated broadcast stations and Comcast Corporation's cable systems. Many are NBC Universal station viewers, and many are subscribers to Comcast Corporation's services.
4. I am familiar with the contents of the foregoing *Petition to Deny Or In the Alternative to Impose Conditions*. The factual assertions made in the petition are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

6/21/10
DATE

Debbie Goldman
Debbie Goldman

FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

Respectfully submitted,


Debbie Goldman
Communications Workers of America

Kevin J. Martin
Mark C. Ellison
Jennifer A. Cetta

Counsel for Communications Workers of America

June 21, 2010